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Agency Fee Arrangements in Labor Agreements:
No Harm in Holding Employers Harmless
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Increasing Importance of Nonmember Employees in Labor
Negotiations and Contracts
In the United States today there are "3 million people who work in a
unionized business and pay union dues but do not choose to be a member
of the union." 1 The number of nonmember employees in traditional union
jobs has grown steadily2 since Congress began to pass laws providing for
this employee status in the late 1940s,3 and since the courts and right-to-
1 Michael Kranish & Bruce Butterfield, Political Funding by Unions Targeted; Bush
signs U.S. Order on Using Member Dues, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 14, 1992, at 3. "[Tlwo
distinct types of employees will most often decline to join the union representing their
bargaining unit. The first includes those employees who are hostile to unions for political or
ideological reasons. The second is typified by those ... who do not want to pay any more
for union representation than they are forced to, called 'free riders.'" See Elena Matsis,
Procedural Rights of Fair Share Objectors after Hudson and Beck, 6 LAB. LAw. 251, 267
(1990) (citing Posner, J., from Gilpin v. American Fed'n of State Employees, 875 F.2d
1310, 1313 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 917 (1989)).
2 Growth in the number of nonmember employees is evidenced by a gradual decline in
union membership that has been occurring since union membership reached its peak
strength of 35% of the work force in 1946. See N. CHAMBERLAIN, ET AL., THE LABOR
SECTOR 124 (3d ed. 1980). According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, "lulnion
membership has been dropping as a percentage of the total work force since 1955, and in
absolute numbers since 1979 .... In 1979, 22.6 million workers were union members; by
[1991], membership had shrunk to 16.6 million." Kenneth C. Crowe, Labor in the '90s; A
Special Report, NEWSDAY, Sept. 6, 1992, at 100. Professor Seymour Lipset, a social
scientist, "trie[d] to explain the sharp drop in union membership [in recent years] ... [by
suggesting] that [beginning] with [President] Reagan, there has been a return to
'individualism,' a 'resurgence of traditional values,' and a 'new American patriotism,'
which has been fatal to organized labor." THOMAS GEOGHEGAN, WHICH SIDE ARE YOU ON?
TRYING TO BE FOR LABOR WHEN IT'S FLAT ON ITS BACK 266 (1991) (quoting Professor
Lipset). The growth in the number of nonmember employees represents only a portion of
the total drop in union membership as the decline also includes employment situations that
have developed in which there is no union representation of employees at all.
3 See ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION, AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 1, 6 (1976) (explaining the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, Pub.
L. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), which provided for amending section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act (1935) to declare that closed shops were illegal, and allowing other
states to outlaw union-security provisions with "right to work" laws); see also Radio
Officer's Union of the Commercial Telegraphers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954)
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work advocates began working to ensure that the employees' constitutional
rights regarding the choice not to join a union were protected.4
Supported by the National Right to Work Foundation,5 nonmember
employees have successfully used the judicial system to support their
independent status in matters outside union bargaining. In 1988, the
Supreme Court provided specific protection for private sector, nonmember
employees in Communications Workers of America v. Beck,6 when the
Court prohibited the collection of fees from nonmember employees for
(utilizing the Labor Management Relations Act section 8(a)(3), 61 Stat. 136 (1947), to
prevent the use of union security agreements for purposes other than to compel the periodic
payment of union dues and initiation fees). Now these provisions are protected by the
National Labor Relations Act, section 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. section 158(a)(3) (1988).
4 See Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 2852 (1991); Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 447 (1984). See
generally, Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 232 (1977).
Suits involving protection of employees' rights under agency shop agreements are
commonly brought under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, which reads:
§ 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights.
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
5 See Milton L. Chappell, From Abood to Tierney: The Protection of Nonunion
Enployees in an Agency Shop; You've Come a Long Way Baby, 15 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 1
(1988). Mr. Chappell, senior staff attorney for the National Right to Work Legal Defense
Foundation, describes the Foundation as "the organization which has provided the legal
assistance to nonunion employees in most cases challenging the constitutionality of the
agency shop." Id. at 1 n.1; see also Gilpin v. American Fed'n of State Employees, 875
F.2d 1310, 1315 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 917 (1989). According to Judge Posner,
"only one challenger is necessary. And there will always be at least one.., the National
Right to Work Foundation will see to that ...." Id.
6 487 U.S. 735, cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1233 (1988). The rights of public sector,
nonmember employees have been protected under agency shop agreements since the
Supreme Court decided Abood in 1977. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 209; Ellis, 466 U.S. at
435; Hudson, 475 U.S. at 292. The Beck decision guaranteed to private sector employees
the same protection, allowing employees in the private sector to bring suits under 42 U.S.C.
section 1983. Beck, 487 U.S. at 761.
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union political contributions and costs unrelated to collective bargaining
and contract administration. However, since Beck, Congress has taken no
action to broaden the protection of nonmember employee rights, and the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has been slow in enforcing the
Beck provided protections in "hundreds of cases . . . pending five to six
years." 7 Therefore, in April 1992, President Bush provided the impetus for
a renewed focus on the rights of nonmember employees by signing
Executive Order 12,800,8 reminding federal employees9 of their right to
control union political contributions made from the fees collected from
each employee.10 The primary purpose of this Executive Order, was to
enforce the protections of the Beck decision by "clarifying
and... bringing up to date requirements for labor organizations to
account for how workers' dues are spent." 1 The principal requirement of
the President's order was the mandatory posting of signs at work sites of
federal contractors informing employees of their rights regarding payment
of fees to the union. 12
Though agreeing that the Beck decision was "fair," and encouraging
the incorporation of the Supreme Court's findings into the fee collection
practices of American labor unions, 13 President Clinton revoked Executive
Order 12,800 on February 1, 1993.14 The President justified the
7 Robert Pear, The 1992 Campaign: Wite House; Bush Attacks Way Unions are Using
Nonmenibers' Fees, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1992 at 1. Jerry M. Hunter, general counsel for
the NLRB, explained that the slow reaction from the Board in enforcing the Court's
decision in Beck can be attributed to the fact that "the Court created a whole new area of the
law, and it took some time for [the agency] to plow through all the cases that were pending
at the [B]oard... [awaiting] the outcome of the Beck case... ." Id.
8 Exec. Order No. 12,800, 57 Fed. Reg. 12,985 (1992).
9 The President's authority extended only to federal employees and those performing
federal contract work. Remarks on Signing the Executive Order on Employee Rights
Concerning Union Dues, 16 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 644 (Apr. 13, 1992).
10 President Bush indicated that his intention in signing this order was "to strengthen
the political rights of American workers... [and to protect]... American workers from
being compelled against their will to pay union or agency dues in excess of what is actually
used for collective bargaining purposes and contract administration." Id.
11 Id.
12 Frank Swoboda, Labor Board to Address Dues Issue; NLRB to Detennine Disclosure
Guidelines, WASH. POST, May 5, 1992, at Cl.
13 President Clinton made these remarks during his campaign in a statement released
after the signing of Executive Order 12,800. Scot Lehigh, Clinton Sees Bush Decree as
"Politics," BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 15, 1992, at 20.
14 Exec. Order No. 12,836, 58 Fed. Reg. 7045 (1993).
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elimination of the order based upon its failure to serve the public good.' 5
The order had placed tremendous monetary and paperwork burdens on
unions while providing no additional protection to the employee beyond the
rights that were already guaranteed by the Supreme Court. 16
Despite the executive disagreement that has arisen over the most
effective method to employ in notifying nonmember employees of their
rights concerning union contributions, there is a shared acknowledgment
that protection of the nonmembers' rights is essential. With this current
emphasis on the nonmember employee, employers and unions must pay
significant attention to the rights 17 of these employees in negotiations and
in the formulation of agreements.
B. Hold Harmless Provisions in Labor Agreements and the Effect of
These Provisions on Nonmember Employees
A new consideration in the drafting of labor agreements requires that a
decision be made concerning whether to include hold harmless provisions
in union-management agreements. Recent litigation has brought into
question the validity of hold harmless agreements between the union and
the employer when the provision is designed to hold the employer harmless
for violations resulting from the incorrect collection of fees from
15 Id.
16 Since the issuance of Executive Order 12,800, union leaders had voiced concern
that the order had "little actual effect-except to create bookkeeping hassles" by requiring
new, more detailed reporting to the U.S. Department of Labor and merely enforcing
spending requirements already established in Beck. Michael Remez, Bush Order on Union
Dues Can Look Like Real Progress - Or Politics, HARTFORD COURANT, Apr. 20, 1992, at
3.
17 Particularly, the First Amendment rights of freedom of expression and association,
and due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Chicago Teachers Union
v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2852 (1991). See Abood v.
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 213 (1977). These rights are not violated by requiring
a nonmember employee to pay fair share fees. See infra note 23. However, the rights are
violated when excessive or improper dues are collected, such as requiring payment of fees
to finance political or ideological causes to which the nonmember employee is opposed.
Abood, 431 U.S. at 235. A union's authority to obtain employees' dues is grounded directly
on federal authority so as to satisfy the First Amendment "state action" requirement even
when private sector employees are those affected by union collections. Beck v.
Communications Workers of Am., 776 F.2d 1187, 1195-1208 (4th Cir. 1985), aft'd, 487
U.S. 735, cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1233 (1988) (guaranteeing protection to private sector
employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
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nonmember employees.' 8 The circuit courts are currently divided about
whether hold harmless clauses used in this context are, in fact, valid and
enforceable provisions when included in labor agreements. 19 At the heart
of the debate is the argument over whether hold harmless provisions
obstruct the protection of nonmember employees' rights by relieving the
employer of any incentive to protect the nonmember. 20 Alternatively, hold
harmless clauses have been described as an efficient and effective means
for ensuring that both the employer and the union meet respective duties to
the nonmember employee. 21
The purpose of this Comment is to explore the discrepancy in the
holdings of the different circuit courts and to emphasize the importance of
developing a policy regarding indemnification on which drafters, cognizant
of nonmember employees' rights, can rely in formulating future collective
bargaining agreements. Specifically, this Comment identifies the
differences between the various circuit courts that have addressed hold
harmless provisions, discusses precedents in other labor contexts that may
assist in reconciling the differences between the circuits, and examines
bargaining circumstances that prohibit a universal or automatic bar to the
use of hold harmless clauses in labor agreements.
C. The Weaver Decision
In Weaver v. University of Cincinnati,22 the Sixth Circuit recently
decided that it was the duty of both the employer and the union to assure
that only fair share fees23 were deducted from the pay of nonmember
18 Conpare Weaver v. University of Cincinnati, 970 F.2d 1523 (6th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1274 (1993) (holding that hold harmless clauses are violative of public
policy and not enforceable) with Hohe v. Casey, 956 F.2d 399, 405 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding
that hold harmless clauses are valid and enforceable).
19 See supra note 18; see also infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
20 Weaver, 970 F.2d at 1538 (referring to Cramer v. Matish, 1990 WL 169640 at *4
(6th Cir. Nov. 2, 1990)).
21 Hohe, 956 F.2d at 412.
22 970 F.2d 1523 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1274 (1993).
23 Fair share fees are fees paid by a nonmember employee to the union to cover the
benefits of union bargaining on the employee's behalf and union administration of the
contract. These contributions have been found constitutionally valid. See generally Chicago
Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2852 (1991);
Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.,
431 U.S. 209 (1977). The Supreme Court has defined the test used to decide whether a
union cost can be deducted as a portion of fair share fees as "whether the ... expenditures
are necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of performing the duties of an
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employees. 24 Specifically, the court found that a "hold-harmless" clause 5
exclusive representative of the employees in dealing with the employer on labor-
management issues . . . [including] direct costs . . . and expenses of activities or
undertakings normally or reasonably employed to implement or effectuate the duties of the
union . . . ." Ellis, 466 U.S. at 448. Therefore, funds collected for the purpose of
advancing the political or ideological ideas of the union are prohibited from being deducted
as fair share contributions from nonmember employees.
Some specific examples of contributions that fit this category and, therefore, would not
be considered valid deductions as fair share fees include costs associated with:
1. efforts on behalf of individual political candidates or political parties,
2. supporting and contributing to charitable organizations which have no employment
related basis or benefit to the local organization,
3. training sessions for individuals to work on local political campaigns,
4. training in voter registration, get-out-the-vote and campaign techniques,
5. political action committees and the staff and salary for such activities.
Richard J. Darko & Janet C. Knapp, Legal Problems in Administering Agency Shop
Agreements - A Union Perspective, 13 J.L. & EDuc. 77, 84-85 (1984).
Agreements providing for the payment of nonmember fees will be called agency shop
agreements, union security agreements, and fair share fee arrangements interchangeably
throughout this Comment.
24 Weaver, 970 F.2d at 1536. Union shop agreements, requiring an employee to join
the union after thirty days of employment, are permissible in Ohio, inasmuch as Ohio has
not adopted a right-to-work statute. GORDON E. JACKSON, LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW
DESK BOOK 713 (1986). However, Weaver involved an agency shop agreement that
required the payment of fair share dues after 60 days of employment, but did not require
union membership. Weaver, 970 F.2d at 1525. The reason for the agency shop agreement
is that the University of Cincinnati is a public employer and section 4117.03 of the Ohio
Revised Code provides that public employees have the right not to join a union.
§ 4117.03 Public employees rights.
(A) Public employees have the right to:
(1) Form, join, assist, or participate in, or refrain from forming, joining, assisting, or
participating in... any employee organization of their own choosing.
OHIO RFv. CODE ANN. § 4117.03 (Anderson 1991) (emphasis added).
Further, even when union membership is required by agreement, what constitutes
membership has been "whittled down to its financial core" and requires merely paying fair
share fees. Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 745, cert. denied,
487 U.S. 1233 (1988) (quoting NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742
(1963)).
It is also possible to have agency fee agreements in the private sector, and for
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in the agreement between the union and the university, in which the union
agreed to indemnify the university for costs and penalties associated with
the violation of a fair-share arrangement, was void as against public
policy. 26 The court was concerned that an employer relieved of "all
consequences for its failure to assume and conscientiously carry out its
duties" to nonmember employees would not give the necessary attention to
the performance of these duties. 27
D. The Importance of a Consistent National Labor Policy
The Sixth Circuit's strong stand against upholding labor agreement
provisions that allow a union to hold an employer harmless when an
employee's rights have been violated by a fair-share arrangement, though
supported by some circuit courts, 28 is in conflict with other circuits that
employees working for private employers to bring claims for violations of employees' rights
under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. Beck, 487 U.S. at 761. For instance, Ohio's collective
bargaining laws include agency shop agreements among the subjects that a union can
negotiate or obtain. Hugh D. Jascourt, Legal Problems in Administering Agency Shop
Agreements, 13 J.L. & EDUc. 59 (1984).
25 The hold harmless provision appeared in article IV, section 3, of the collective
bargaining agreement and read:
Section 3. Hold Harmless.
The Union further agrees to save the University harmless from any legal action
growing out of these checkoff deductions that may be instituted by an employee
involved therein before a court, or any other body asserting or having jurisdiction,
against the University as well as reasonable costs and expenses involved in defense
of any such action ....
Weaver, 970 F.2d at 1525.
26 Id. at 1538.
27 Id. at 1538 (emphasis added).
28 See Cramer v. Matish, 1990 WL 169640 at *4 (6th Cir. Nov. 2, 1990) (holding that
hold harmless provisions in labor agreements violate public policy); see also Patterson v.
American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 270 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976)
(finding that a union may not bargain away employees' rights through the use of an
indemnity provision); Lachman v. Sperry-Sun Well Surveying Co., 457 F.2d 850, 854
(10th Cir. 1972) (explaining that public policy prohibits the enforcement of contracts or
agreements that function to harm third parties). See generally Stamford Bd. of Educ. v.
Stamford Educ. Ass'n, 697 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that an employer will lack
concern for protecting a nonmember's constitutional rights if the employer will be
indemnified for any loss resulting from the violation).
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have considered this matter. 29 In describing the function of a collective
bargaining agreement and its provisions, the Supreme Court has explained
that an agreement "is more than a contract; it is a generalized code to
govern a myriad of cases which draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate." 30
Therefore, "[i]n defining the relationships created by such an agreement,
the Court has applied an evolving federal common law grounded in
national labor policy." 31 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has established
that in a labor context, it is necessary to have a consensus on policy upon
which future agreements can be based. 32
II. CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS REGARDING HOLD HARMLESS
PROVISIONS
A. The Sixth Circuit Ban on Hold Harmless Provisions
In Weaver, the Sixth Circuit based its holding on the precedent
established in Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson,33 a Supreme Court
29 See Hohe v. Casey, 956 F.2d 399 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that hold harmless
provisions do not violate public policy); see also Solo Cup Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 619
F.2d 1178 (7th Cir.) (likening hold harmless clauses to insurance policies and finding the
provisions not violative of public policy), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1033 (1980); Caplan v.
Johnson, 414 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1969) (holding that hold harmless clauses function as
insurance policies which have been found not to violate public policy).
30 Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212, 224 (1983) (quoting
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960)).
31 Bowen, 459 U.S. at 224, 225; see also Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448 (1957) (holding that section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
authorized federal courts to develop a federal common law regarding enforcement of
collective bargaining agreements); Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel Employees Int'l Union,
417 U.S. 249, 255 (1974) (quoting Textile Workers).
32 See supra note 31; see also Clyde W. Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turn: A
Changing of the Guard, 67 NEB. L. REv. 7, 14-15 (1988). Professor Summers, Fordham
Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania, suggests that this consensus must be
established in the courts because there is an "increasing reliance on the law to regulate the
labor market" and that the focus of this judicial and legislative regulation is on personal
rights of employees. Id. at 16. It is unlikely that the NLRB will be the only force in
establishing this policy because federal courts have jurisdiction over agency fee claims
concerning breaches of the duty of fair representation and violations of employees' First
Amendment rights. The primary jurisdiction of the NLRB is limited to strict National Labor
Relations Act section 8(a)(3) claims. See Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487
U.S. 735, 742, cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1233 (1988).
33 475 U.S. 292 (1986), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2852 (1991).
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decision that is often cited as the foundation of the agency shop
agreement. 34 In Hudson, the Court outlined the constitutional requirements
for the union collection of fees from nonunion employees. 35 In doing so,
the Court indicated that the public employer has the primary duty to ensure
that the deduction plan for fair-share fees is constitutionally valid. 36
Therefore, the Weaver court determined that allowing an employer to be
completely indemnified for constitutional violations of employees' rights
would be contrary to public policy.37 The Sixth Circuit had demonstrated
its intention to follow the Hudson decision five years before its holding in
Weaver.38 On this basis, the decision in Weaver was clearly foreseeable.
B. The Third Circuit-Constitutionality Is a Union Duty
However, only a few months before the Weaver decision, the Third
Circuit interpreted Hudson as requiring that the union and the employer
have a constitutional procedure in place for deducting fees, but rejected
that Hudson had specified that the employer must have established the
constitutionality of the procedure before deductions were made.39
Following this interpretation, the Third Circuit held that the employer can
delegate the overseeing of constitutionality to the union because the union
"has a significant incentive to ensure that its procedures comply with the
34 The Supreme Court first found that agency shop requirements in the public sector
were constitutional in Abood. See Chappell, supra note 5, at 1 (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd.
of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977)). However, it was not until the Court decided Hudson, nine
years later, that employees were provided with a "concrete means to effectuate their
constitutional right to refrain from supporting the vast noncollective bargaining pursuits of
labor unions." Id. at 3 (citing Hudson, 475 U.S. at 292).
35 Hudson, 475 U.S. at 310. Constitutional requirements include "an adequate
explanation of the basis for the fee, a reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge the
amount of the fee... and an escrow for the amounts reasonably in dispute while such
challenges are pending." Id.
36 Weaver v. University of Cincinnati, 970 F.2d 1523, 1537 (6th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1274 (1993) (citing Hudson v. Chicago Teachers Union, 743 F.2d 1187,
1192 (7th Cir. 1984), af'd, 475 U.S. 292 (1986), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2852 (1991)).
3 7 Id. at 1538.
38 See Tierney v. City of Toledo, 824 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1987) (emphasizing the
court's intention to follow Hudson in the Sixth Circuit). "[Public employers] owe a duty [to
their] nonunion employees to assure that [their] ordinances [and agreements] will not permit
the union to deprive [employees] of their rights under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments." Id. at 1505 (citing Hudson, 475 U.S. at 307-08 n.20).
39 Hohe v. Casey, 956 F.2d 399, 405 (3d Cir. 1992).
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Constitution." 40 Therefore, the Third Circuit found hold harmless clauses4'
pertaining to fair-share fee arrangements valid, and not violative of an
employee's First Amendment rights. 42
C. Employer Incentives to Protect Nonmembers' Rights
The Sixth Circuit explained the discrepancy of its holding with that of
the Third Circuit based upon the fact that in Hohe the hold harmless
provision did not cover the costs of defending a suit for violations of
constitutional requirements. 43 The rationale underlying this justification is
that the cost of defending a suit makes an employer more attentive to its
duty to uphold the constitutionality of the fees being deducted. 44 Though
the threat of having to pay large attorney's fees and court costs may work
as a strong incentive for an employer to avoid violating nonmembers'
rights, it is not the only deterrent that will provide for this protection. In
fact, the Hohe court specifically rejected the argument that the cost of
defending a suit is a necessary deterrent to the employer, stating that "even
if [the union] would indemnify the [employer] for such costs and fees
under [an indemnification] clause, we do not believe that this should
matter." 45
One basic justification for allowing indemnification is that regardless of
whether the employer faces the monetary costs of a trial, litigation is never
without costs. The cost of litigation cannot be measured in monetary terms
alone, but also includes intangible costs associated with "the injury it
brings to organizational morale and the diversion that it requires of
40 Id. at 412.
41 The hold harmless provision in Hohe read: "The Union shall indemnify and hold the
Employer harmless against any and all claims, suits, orders, or judgments brought or issued
against the Employer as a result of the action taken or not taken by the Employer under the
provisions in this Article." Hohe, 956 F.2d at 411.
42 The court did acknowledge, however, that "[t]he indemnification clause [did] not
immunize the [employer]. The [employer] may be called upon to defend the deduction of
fees and may be enjoined from imposing the fair share fees on nonmembers when it is
determined that the exclusive representative has not complied with the constitutional
requirements." Id. at 411.
43 Weaver v. University of Cincinnati, 970 F.2d 1523, 1537 (6th Cir. 1992) cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1274 (1993).
44 See Tierney v. City of Toledo, 824 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1987); Stamford Bd. of
Educ. v. Stamford Educ. Ass'n, 697 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1982); Dixon v. City of Chicago, 669
F. Supp 851, 852 (N.D. MI1. 1987).
45 Hohe, 956 F.2d at 412.
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management time and talent. "46Therefore, an incentive to avoid litigation
exists for prudent business managers, regardless of whether monetary costs
are involved. In a labor setting, the issues of employee morale and loyalty
alone provide a strong incentive for the employer to avoid litigation by
ensuring that an employee's rights are protected.
However, should the functional incentives prove to be too weak a
stimulus to ensure employer protection of nonmembers' rights, stronger
employer incentives also exist. The maintenance of labor management
relations and the monetary costs that are associated with intentional
violations of employer-assigned duties also function as an impetus for the
employer to meet its duty to the nonmember employee.47 Employers are
never without incentives to protect nonmembers' rights even when hold
harmless provisions are included in labor agreements.
III. EXISTING NATIONAL LABOR POLICY
A. Employer Reliance on the Union in the Protection of Employee
Rights
In other labor contexts, the Supreme Court has made the union
responsible for protecting employees' rights and has allowed the employer
to rely on the union's decisions in matters affecting employees. 48
Explaining the union duty in a union-management relationship, Justice
Powell stated that: "By seeking and acquiring the exclusive right and
power to speak for a group of employees, the union assumes the
corresponding duty to discharge the responsibility faithfully-a duty which
it owes to the employees whom it represents and on which the employer
with whom it bargains may rely." 49 The justification for this stance is that
"requiring the union to pay damages... provide[s] an additional incentive
for the union" to protect the employee.50 However, in applying this
principle, the courts have acknowledged that the employer and union have
individual obligations to employees, and that each is responsible for
4 6 ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS INCLUDING
PARTNERSHIPS & Lmrmn PARTNERSHIPS 1148 (4th ed. 1990).
47 See Parts I" and IV of this Comment for further development and discussion of
these incentives.
48 See Clayton v. Automobile Workers, 451 U.S. 679, 686-687 (1981) (allowing an
employer to rely on the union's decision regarding processing of grievances).
49 Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212, 227 (1983).
50 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 187 (1967).
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damages caused by the violation of an employee's constitutional rights. 51 In
fact, the Supreme Court in Bowen specifically warned that imposing total
liability on the employer, while excusing the union, would be antithetical
to achieving the goal of ensuring that an employee's rights are protected. 52
Several circuit courts that have addressed the respective obligations of
employers and unions regarding employees' rights have applied a Bowen-
type rationale to the corresponding situation in which the union, alone,
would be held responsible for damages. 53 These courts have explained that
in a suit between the employee and the union, if a hold harmless provision
in a labor agreement requires the union to pay for damages to an employee
caused by a violation of the employee's rights regardless of the outcome,
then the union has no incentive to pursue claims arising from this litigation
against an employer.54 Under these conditions, courts assume that an
employer will become lax in its protection of the employee because the
union has assumed sole responsibility for any damages. 55 The courts warn
that the same danger of violation that exists when the employer is given the
sole responsibility of protecting employees' rights will also exist when this
duty is completely delegated to the union through a hold harmless
provision. 56 Yet, current labor policy may require the employer to rely on
the union in regard to the protection of nonmember employees' rights. 57
51 See Bowen, 459 U.S. at 227 (interpreting Vaca to require allocation of
responsibilities between the employer and the union).52 Id.
53 See Lachman v. Sperry-Sun Well Surveying Co., 457 F.2d 850, 854 (10th Cir.
1972); see also Stamford Bd. of Educ. v. Stamford Educ. Ass'n, 697 F.2d 70 (2d Cir.
1982) (presenting a civil rights parallel). See generally Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v.
National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 1186-87 (8th Cir. 1979) (presenting an
antitrust parallel).
54 See Lachnan, 457 F.2d at 854; see also Professional Beauty Supply, 594 F.2d at
1186-87. This situation would only occur when the employee sued the union directly, and
the employer was not joined. Therefore, the employer would have no monetary or other
litigation costs.
55 Weaver v. University of Cincinnati, 970 F.2d 1523, 1538 (6th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1274 (1993).
56 Conq are Bowen, 459 U.S. at 227 (explaining that the employer should not be given
the sole responsibility for protecting employees' rights) with Weaver, 970 F.2d at 1538 and
Lachnan, 457 F.2d at 854 and Stamford, 697 F.2d at 70 (explaining that the union should
not be given the sole responsibility for protecting employees' rights).
57 See infra notes 58-73 and accompanying text.
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B. Labor Decisions Construed with Reference to Existing Federal
Labor Policy-Necessary Hold Harmless Provisions
Labor decisions cannot exist in isolation, but must encompass an
overall labor policy that reflects general social and political values. 58
Therefore, to guarantee a cohesive labor policy, the courts, in considering
the validity of a hold harmless provision in a labor agreement, must look to
other areas of labor law that tangentially affect or are affected by the
decision at hand.
1. Agency Fees as a Nonmandatory Subject of Bargaining
In 1990, the D.C. Circuit held that the amount of the agency fee is not
a mandatory 59 subject of bargaining. 60 Specifically, the court found that
"the amount of an agency fee concerns primarily the relationship between
the union and the nonmember employees; it is not 'an aspect of the
relationship between the employer and employees' . . . [and therefore]...
is not a mandatory subject of bargaining .... "61 Because this bargaining
subject is not mandatory, the union is not required to disclose to the
employer the financial information upon which the agency fee is based
during bargaining and formulation of the agreement. 62 It follows that the
58 Summers, supra note 32, at 19. The Supreme Court has instructed that labor
decisions must be made in pari materia (construed with reference to) other labor legislation
and judicial decisions. See Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S.
365 (1990).
59 Bargaining subjects are either mandatory or permissive depending on the nature of
the issue. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). See
generally Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers, Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co., 404 U.S. 157, 178 (1971).
60 North Bay Dev. Disabilities Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 905 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1082 (1991). The D.C. Circuit first established that agency fees were
not a mandatory subject of bargaining in 1982. See International Union of the United Ass'n
of Journeymen of Plumbing Indus. v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983).
61 North Bay, 905 F.2d at 478 (quoting Allied Chen. & Alkali Workers, 404 U.S. at
178).
62 Id. at 479. However, the calculation of the fair share must be verified by an
independent auditor, so there is a guarantee beyond the union representation that ensures
that the amount deducted from a nonmember's pay is correct. See Chicago Teachers Union
v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 307 n.18 (1986), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2852 (1991); see also
Tierney v. City of Toledo, 824 F.2d 1497, 1504 (6th Cir. 1987); Lowary v. Lexington
Local Bd. of Edue., 704 F. Supp 1430, 1445 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (describing Tierney as
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employer deprived of the information under these conditions should be
allowed to protect itself through a valid hold harmless provision in the final
agreement. 63
The nonmember employee is protected, regardless of the lack of
involvement by the employer, because the courts have required the union
to provide the employees with professionally audited financial information
concerning the deduction of agency fees directly before the deduction is
made.64 Therefore, the union65 and employer would agree that the primary
duty to enforce the nonmember's rights lies with the union, and that hold
harmless clauses between the union and the employer may not only be
valid, but also necessary given these circumstances. 66
requiring a detailed accounting by the union and the auditor explaining the calculation of
agency fees), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 958 (1990). Further, the union is required to provide
an "adequate disclosure" of expenditures and an explanation of the basis for the fee to
nonmembers before collecting any fees. Hudson, 475 U.S. at 307 n.18.
63 The courts have not yet addressed whether a hold harmless provision would be valid
under these circumstances. Weaver, decided later, did not consider North Bay when holding
that hold harmless clauses were per se violative of public policy when applied to agency fee
situations. See Weaver v. University of Cincinnati, 970 F.2d 1523 (6th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1274 (1993).
64 Hudson, 475 U.S. at 307 n.18. For a detailed discussion of the federal courts'
interpretation of what is needed to meet the notice and disclosure requirements, and the
expenditure disclosure requirements under Hudson, see Matsis, supra note 1, at 275-79.
65 The union would rather be responsible directly to the nonmember employee for
meeting its existing duty to disclose financial information than be forced to endure an
additional and unnecessary burden of providing like information to the employer. Unions
and union supporters have adamantly opposed additional regulations on labor relations and
are willing to take on the primary duty of protecting and bargaining for all employees. See
Kranish & Butterfield, supra note 1. Senator Edward Kennedy objecting to Executive Order
No. 12,800 stated that "imposing burdensome new regulations on labor . . . [is]
unfair... ." Id.; see also Remez, supra note 16 at 3. "Union leaders have argued that the
new reporting requirements will impose another paperwork burden." Id.; see also
GEOGHEGAN, supra note 2, at 251. Taking this idea to the extreme, Lane Kirldand,
President of the AFL-CIO, called for the repeal of all labor laws several years ago, insisting
that employers and unions could effectuate better agreements for the employer, union, and
the employee without the current laws and regulations, which are often ignored. Id.
66 See infra notes 68-81, explaining the need for indemnification provisions arising in
circumstances that deprive the employer of information necessary to protect the
nonmembers' rights.
1130 [Vol. 54:1117
AGENCY FEE ARRANGEMENTS
2. Preservation of the Employment Relationship-Necessary
Employer Reliance on Union Representations
In a context similar to the decision in North Bay, the First Circuit held
that an employer could rely on the union to carry out its duty to the
employee. 67 The court explained that to prohibit the employer from relying
on the union would require that in order "[t]o protect itself
from.., liability.., an employer would be forced to ignore union
representations and take the initiative in dealing with employees whenever
it suspect[ed] a discriminatory motive. Such conduct would.., have
a ... detrimental effect on labor-management relations .... "68
Thus, a possible consequence of prohibiting hold harmless provisions,
although allowing the union to withhold information concerning the
fairness of pay deductions, would be the weakening of the framework upon
which union-management relations are based. 69 Under these circumstances,
the union would no longer operate as the sole representative of the
employees because the employer would now be directly responsible for
nonmember employees. The employer would be required to establish
independently, and upon its own initiative, that the fees being deducted
were fair to the nonmember. 70 Not only does this requirement create an
insurmountable burden for the employer, 71 but also jeopardizes the
67 Carrol v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 417 F.2d 1025, 1028 (1st Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1039 (1970).
68 Charles A. Edwards, Employers' Liability for Union Unfair Representation:
Fiduciary Duty or Bargaining Reality?, 27 LABOR L.J 686, 687 (1976) (citing Carroll v.
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 417 F.2d 1025, 1028 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 1039 (1970) and describing the harm of holding the employer responsible for
inadvertent participation in the union's discriminatory practice against an employee in an
unfair representation case).
69 A judicial pronouncement holding the employer liable for the accuracy of
information provided to it by the union has been likened to a Damoclean sword hanging
over the entire employment relationship. Edwards, supra note 68, at 687. Damocles was a
"courtier of ancient Syracuse held to have been seated at a banquet beneath a sword hung
by a single hair." WEBSTER's NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 323 (1985).
70 Edwards, supra note 68. This may require the employer to obtain the services of an
additional independent auditor to verify the fairness of the fees. See Chicago Teachers
Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 307 n.18 (1986) (requiring verification of the fees by an
independent auditor), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2852 (1991).
71 The employer is not privy to all financial information held by the union and, even
with an auditor, is likely to have an incomplete set of figures upon which to base the
accuracy of the agency fee deduction. Only "the unions possess the facts and records from
which... expenditures can reasonably be calculated .... " Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.,
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constitutionality of the security arrangement.
The Supreme Court has found that a nonmember's rights are not
violated when that employee is forced to pay his fair share of the union
costs of bargaining. 72 However, should the bargaining relationship change
so that the employer is charged with the duty and cost of representing the
nonmember employee in the bargaining process independently, the
deduction of the agency fee for this service would be constitutionally
questionable. Under this scenario, the union has allowed the duty of
nonmember bargaining to be shifted to the employer, 73 and therefore,
should no longer be allowed to collect bargaining fees from the
nonmember. 74
3. Employer Protection-Inherent and Express
To avoid a potential conflict in the employment relationship, the court
in North Bay found an inherent protection to the employer, similar to one
expressly agreed to in a hold harmless provision, in situations in which the
union is allowed to withhold agency fee information from the employer. 75
The court emphasized that the employer is protected from charges of unfair
labor practices when it relies on the agency fee deduction that is provided
by the union, and therefore, would not have to initiate its own procedure
for guaranteeing the accuracy of the fee.76
However, the existence of this protection does not completely relieve
431 U.S. 209, 239-40 n.40 (1977).
72 See Hudson, 475 U.S. at 301; Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435,
447 (1984); Abood, 431 U.S. at 232.
73 This shift is not an outcome that the union would favor because unions have
traditionally considered employees to be "property of the union" and would not look
positively on relinquishing this control. See generally Goodbye to All That; Decline of Labor
Union Influence, NAT'L REV., May 11, 1992, at 14.
74 See Abood, 431 U.S. at 232; see also Hudson, 475 U.S. at 293; Ellis, 466 U.S. at
447. The Supreme Court explained in these cases that deducting fees from a nonmember's
pay is only constitutional when the fees deducted are proportionate to the benefits derived
from the union bargaining for the nonmember and administering the contract.
75 North Bay Dev. Disabilities Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 905 F.2d 476, 479 (D.C. Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1082 (1991). "The Employer in this case voice[d] the concern
that it might be charged with an unfair labor practice if it with[held] excessive fees" in
reliance on the union-provided amount to be withheld. However, the court concluded that
"[tihis apprehension . . . appear[ed] . . . to be unfounded" when the employer had no
reason to believe that the fee was unlawful. Id.
76 Id.
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the employer of its duty to the nonmember employee. 77 If the employer has
"reason to believe that the fee was unlawful," and nonetheless agreed to
collect this fee, it would be committing an unfair labor practice. 78 Public
policy prohibits an employer from intentionally violating a nonmember
employee's rights while relying on inherent or express protection for
itself. 79 Yet, when excess fees were deducted without knowledge of any
wrongdoing, the employer would be protected. 80 Prudent employers would
guarantee the protection alluded to by the court by requiring that an
express hold harmless provision be included in the final agreement. 81
C. Indemnification Provisions as Insurance Policies
Circuit courts have further justified the use of hold harmless clauses
between the union and the employer because insurance policies are not
violative of public policy, and a hold harmless provision serves the same
purpose as an insurance policy for the employer. 82 The fact that public
policy dictates that coverage be excluded when an employer intentionally
acts in violation of an employee's rights, serves as a deterrent to any
7 7 See H.C. Macaulay Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 553 F.2d 1198, 1201-02 (9th Cir.
1977) (suggesting that the employer cannot intentionally allow an employee's rights to be
violated).
78 North Bay, 905 F.2d at 479; see also Helmsley-Spear, Inc. v. NLRB, 275 NLRB
262, 268 (1985).
79 This prohibition is a traditional legal premise, simply stated by Judge Cardozo:
"[N]o one shall be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong." Messersmith v.
American Fidelity Co., 133 N.E. 432, 433 (N.Y. 1921).
80 See North Bay, 905 F.2d at 479; see also Solo Cup Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 619
F.2d 1178, 1187 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1033 (1980); Caplan v. Johnson, 414
F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1969); Union Camp Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 452 F. Supp.
565, 568 (S.D. Ga. 1978) (likening indemnification to an insurance policy that would
prohibit coverage when a claimant's intentional acts create the need for payment).
81 William F. Kay et al., Legal Problems in Adnnistering Agency Shop Agreements-
A Managenment Perspective, 13 J.L. & EDUC. 61, 73-75 (1984) (suggesting the use of hold
harmless clauses by an employer to protect itself from union actions over which it has little
or no control); see also R. Theodore Clark, Jr., A Guide to the Changing Court Rulings on
Union Security in the Public Sector: A Managenent Perspective, 14 J.L. & EDUC. 71, 83
(1985) (suggesting the "[i]nclusion of a 'wall-to-wall' indemnification clause to protect and
hold the employer harmless against any and all costs and damages resulting from the
employer's implementation of a fair share agreement"); Edwards, supra note 68, at 691
(suggesting that the employer bargain for a broad indemnification clause to prevent liability
to the employer).82 See Solo Cup, 619 F.2d at 1187; Union Camp, 452 F. Supp. at 568.
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incentive the employer may have to violate its duty to the employee. 83
Commentators have argued that indemnification is not the same as
insurance because insurance policies spread the risk and cost to many
entities paying insurance and not solely to the union, like the hold harmless
clause. 84 However, this argument seems inconsequential because the union
owes a duty to the nonmember employee and should be prepared to cover
the damages to an employee if this duty is breached.8 5 Alternatively, an
insurance policy covers only the monetary consequences of accidental
damages not caused by any breach of a duty by the insurance company. 86
Spreading the risk is not the intention of the hold harmless clause, because
the union is bound by its own duty to the nonmember employee, and the
employer simply relies on the union not to breach this duty. 87
Those opposing the insurance comparison also argue that the
possibility of higher premiums from an insurance claim functions as a
disincentive to the employer or claimant, whereas hold harmless clauses do
not have the same disincentive. 88 However, the costs of litigation,
measured in time and loss of morale, discourage an employer from
breaching a duty to the employee regardless of a hold harmless provision
83 See Solo Cup, 619 F.2d at 1187; Union Canp, 452 F. Supp. at 568.
84 See Stamford Bd. of Educ. v. Stamford Educ. Ass'n, 697 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir.
1982) (citing Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d
1179, 1186 (8th Cir. 1979)).
85 See Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212, 226 (1983) (explaining in
general terms the union duty to the employee); see also Hohe v. Casey, 956 F.2d 399, 412
(3d Cir. 1992) (describing the union incentive to protect employees' rights). There has been
some discussion that if the union is forced to pay for damages to nonmember employees,
then the payment may be made using funds collected as dues from these employees.
Stamford, 697 F.2d at 74. Even if this were true, requiring the union to pay damages would
function as a greater incentive to the union to protect nonmembers' rights than would
allowing the union to retain the agency fees while requiring the employer to pay the
damages. Further, without a hold harmless provision, the payment of damages does not
shift to the employer alone because the union is still responsible for its share of the
damages. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77,
83 (1981). The partial payment would come from the same union source. Therefore, this
argument against hold harmless provisions is meritless as the nonmember employee would
be made whole regardless of whether the employer or union paid the damages. See Bowen,
459 U.S. at 220-24 (1983).
86 See generally Steven L. Willborn, Insurance, Public Policy, and Employment
Discrindnation, 66 MINN. L. REv. 1003, 1028-29 (1982).
87 See Hohe v. Casey, 956 F.2d 399, 412 (3d Cir. 1992).
88 Stamford, 697 F.2d at 74.
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compensating the employer for monetary damages and costs. 8 9 Further,
public policy would prohibit protection by the provision should the breach
be intentional. 90 Therefore, employer incentives to protect nonmember
employees' rights remain in force despite the limited protection of a hold
harmless provision in the agreement.
IV. PUBLIC POLICY
In Weaver, the Sixth Circuit decided generally that hold harmless
provisions regarding fair-share fee arrangements were violative of public
policy because, under these agreements, the employer no longer had an
incentive to protect the nonmember employees' rights. 91 However, in
interpreting Ohio law, the Sixth Circuit has also cautioned that "the
violation of public policy is measured by the tendency of the contract to
injure the public good rather than by actual injury under particular
circumstances." 92 This Comment has attempted to introduce various
circumstances under which hold harmless provisions would be in keeping
with the public good, 93 protective of nonmember employees' rights, 94 and
beneficial to the union-management relationship. 95 Therefore, it is not
dispositive that hold harmless clauses, in general, are violative of public
policy.
A. The Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has traditionally held that the exercise of freedom
of contract is not to be lightly interfered with, and that it is only "in clear
cases that contracts will be held void" as against public policy.96 Thus, the
89 See HAMILTON, supra note 46, at 1148.
90 Solo Cup Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 619 F.2d 1178, 1187 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1033 (1980); Union Camp Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 452 F. Supp. 565,
568 (S.D. Ga. 1978).
91 Weaver v. University of Cincinnati, 970 F.2d 1523, 1538 (6th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1274 (1993).
92 L'Orange v. Medical Protective Co., 394 F.2d 57, 60 (6th Cir. 1968).
93 See supra notes 30-32, 43-52 and accompanying text.
94 See supra notes 43-47, 77-81 and accompanying text.
95 See supra notes 59-81 and accompanying text.
96 Steele v. Drummond, 275 U.S. 199, 205 (1927). Though the Steele decision was
handed down in an era when freedom of contract was considered a substantive right by the
Court, its principle continues to be applied today. See Union Camp Corp. v. Continental
Casualty Co., 452 F. Supp. 565, 568 (S.D. Ga. 1978); Greenwood Cemetery, Inc. v.
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circuit courts should uphold hold harmless clauses included in union-
management agreements when the provision is created for reasonable and
just purposes and when the primary goal is to protect the rights of
nonmember employees. 97
B. Congress
The Weaver court found a shortage of published opinions dealing with
the validity of indemnification of a public employer for violations of
employees' rights, and therefore, chose to rely on Stamford Board of
Education v. Stamford Education Association98 in reaching its decision.99
In Stamford, the Second Circuit held that public policy prohibited hold
harmless provisions in collective bargaining agreements that were written
to protect an employer from violations of federal civil rights policy. 100
However, the area of law concerning civil rights is vastly different from
that pertaining to fair-share fees because, in both the Equal Pay Act and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Congress has provided a comprehensive
statutory scheme that does not include contribution or indemnification.10'
The Supreme Court has explained that federal common law does not come
into play when Congress has provided a "carefully considered legislative
program" on a given subject matter. 10 2 However, Congress has not
provided the same type of guidelines for dealing with hold harmless clauses
pertaining to fair-share fees. When Congress has been silent on the issue,
the Supreme Court has conceded that there is a "modern trend of federal-
court decisions favoring contribution" 10 3 or the payment of a party's
Travelers Indem. Co., 232 S.E.2d 910, 914 (Ga. 1977). See generally, Solo Cup Co. v.
Federal Ins. Co., 619 F.2d 1178 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1033 (1980).
9 7 The Supreme Court has specified that it is of paramount importance, in a situation in
which an employee's rights have been violated by an employer's and the union's breach, for
the employee to be made whole. See Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212,
220-224 (1983).
98 697 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1982).
99 Weaver v. University of Cincinnati, 970 F.2d 1523, 1536 (6th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1274 (1993).
100 Stamford Bd. of Educ. v. Stamford Educ. Ass'n, 697 F.2d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 1982)
(holding that a hold harmless provision allowing for violations of civil rights is prohibited
under the Equal Pay Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act).
101 Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 97
(1981).
102 Id.
103 Id. at 83.
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"share of the common liability." 104 More current cases take this even
further, providing a foundation for the argument that federal common law
may allow the union to hold an employer harmless for violations of a fair-
share fee arrangement. 10 5 Therefore, contrary to the holding in Weaver,
public policy may encourage rather than discourage the use of hold
harmless provisions in labor agreements.
V. CONCLUSION
As the Weaver court noted, few circuit courts have written decisions
concerning the validity of hold harmless provisions pertaining specifically
to agency fee deductions. 1°6 However, nonmember employees as a group
are a growing segment of the labor force, and guidelines for protecting
these employees are becoming increasingly important in the formation of
labor agreements. 107 Currently, the circuit courts disagree over the validity
of indemnification clauses between unions and employers. 108 It is essential,
however, that this issue be considered within the broad scope of existing
labor policy, and that a consensus be reached upon which drafters of labor
agreements can rely in penning future labor agreements. 109
The protection of a nonmember employee's rights is the duty of both
the employer and the union. 110 This Comment, therefore, does not
advocate that either the union or the employer be relieved of this duty to
the nonmember nor imply that either party should be allowed to shift the
duty to the other. Instead, it suggests that the duties of both parties can be
met even while relying on labor agreements that include hold harmless
provisions.
The court in Weaver found hold harmless provisions violative of public
policy primarily because of the belief that allowing the indemnification
provisions would cause the employer to disregard its duty to the
nonmember employee. 111 However, since the origin of the agency fee, the
104 Id. at 88.
105 See supra notes 29, 40-42, 60-90 and accompanying text.
106 Weaver v. University of Cincinnati, 970 F.2d 1523, 1536 (6th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1274 (1993).
107 See supra notes 1-17 and accompanying text.
108 Compare supra note 28 with note 29.
109 See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
110 Weaver, 970 F.2d at 1538.
111 Id. at 1538. See generally Tierney v. City of Toledo, 824 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir.
1987); Collins v. City of Detroit, 780 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1986) (prohibiting protection of a
public servant not acting in an official capacity on the basis that public policy creates an
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courts have held that agency fee cost allocation is the primary duty of the
union. Hudson provided specific guidelines for informing nonmember
employees of union financial data used in calculating agency fee
deductions, but did not indicate that this information must also be provided
to the employer. 112 Further, in North Bay, the D.C. Circuit held that the
financial information need only be provided to the employees, specifically
excluding the employer as a recipient. 113 Therefore, it would be
inconsistent with existing labor policy to find an employer who is legally
deprived of agency fee calculation information by the union, responsible
for ensuring the accuracy of that fee.
Yet, an employer has a duty when deducting agency fees from the pay
of the nonmember, not to deduct an amount that it knows or has reason to
know is excessive. 114 This duty exists regardless of whether a hold
harmless provision is written into the labor agreement, and regardless of
whether union financial information has been provided to the employer. 115
Further, the employer has additional considerations, including loyalty,
morale, and time, that work as incentives for the employer to protect the
nonmember employees' rights and to avoid litigation.116
Therefore, indemnification provisions may allow the union to be made
principally, but not solely, responsible for upholding nonmember
employees' rights. 117 Most important, hold harmless clauses should be
upheld when written to assure that an employee will be made whole should
the employee's rights be violated by an agency fee deduction, 118 and when
used to protect the union-management relationship. 119
Karin S. Phalen
individual duty).
112 Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 307 n.18 (1986), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 2852 (1991).
113 North Bay Dev. Disabilities Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 905 F.2d 476, 478 (D.C. Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1082 (1991).
114 Id. at 479.
115 See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
116 See HAMILTON, supra note 46, at 1148.
117 Compare Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212, 226 (1983)
(prohibiting sole responsibility for damages being attributed to one party employer or union)
with Hohe v. Casey, 956 F.2d 399, 405 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that the employer can
delegate the overseeing of constitutionality to the union) and North Bay, 905 F.2d at 479
(making the union principally responsible for the accuracy of agency fee deductions).
118 Bowen, 459 U.S. at 220-24 (explaining that making the employee whole is of
principal importance).
119 See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
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